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Globalization is now a central theme in the affairs of the Pacific Islands,
and Pacific Islands governments are caught up in the rhetoric, the ideol-
ogy, and the economic policies of globalization. Policymakers in govern-
ments and regional organizations pepper their conversations with phrases
drawn from that branch of politics called economics. These include
“achieving effective private–public sector partnerships,” “improving the
attractiveness of the foreign investment regime,” “facilitating investment
transparency,” “adopting free and open trade amongst our Island coun-
tries,” “reducing public sector subsidies,” “promoting integration into the
world economy,” “enabling public enterprises to operate on commercial
principles,” “providing a policy environment to encourage commercial
activity,” and “encouraging the development of the private sector so that
it assumes a leading role as the primary engine of growth.”
Where did this language and these ideas come from? To answer these
questions, it is first necessary to define globalization, a term with many
meanings in the fin-de-siècle conversation about the state of the world,
signifying everything from the expansion of Europe since Columbus to
the emergence of a global, Americanized consumer culture. These wider
historical and cultural definitions are too broad to be useful for my argu-
ment, which focuses on the economic dimensions of globalization. So I
follow two economists, Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright, in call-
ing globalization a “process in which the production and financial struc-
tures of countries are becoming interlinked by an increasing number of
cross-border transactions to create an international division of labor in
which national wealth comes, increasingly, to depend on economic agents
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in other countries” (1996, 3). Globalization is characterized by huge
increases in flows of capital across the world, rapid growth in trade, the
emergence of new kinds of trade in services, a technological revolution in
communications that makes the globe itself the site of operations for
major companies, and the growing influence almost everywhere of mar-
ket forces.
People agree that these developments should be called globalization,
but they disagree about whether globalization is new, to what extent it
undermines the power of states, and how governments should respond. I
consider these issues one by one.
First, globalization is sometimes thought to be without precedent. In
some respects—above all in the speed and volume of global information
flows—it has no parallel in history. Yet in other respects the globalization
of the present era can be seen as a return to an earlier period of global-
ization that began in the 1870s and ended in 1914. As in the present, new
technologies of transport and communications were combining with cap-
italism to spread markets worldwide. The parallels with the computeriza-
tion of the late twentieth century were the railways, telegraphs, and under-
water cables of the late nineteenth, linking the world together for the first
time. At that time, as now, capital moved freely about the globe in search
of the highest returns, and governments did not restrict its flow. Multi-
national corporations were engaged in direct foreign investment on a
scale, which, at more than nine percent of global output in 1913, was
comparable with such investment at the end of the twentieth century.
Britain, the world’s greatest exporter of goods, services, and capital, was
a free-trade country and had imposed free trade on many parts of the
colonial world. By this interpretation of global economic history, a first
era of globalization was interrupted by two world wars, a depression, and
a quarter century of government controls and Keynesian regulation from
which the world began to emerge only in the 1970s.
Second, experts disagree about whether globalization undermines the
power of states. Some say globalization is rapidly rendering national bor-
ders irrelevant to economic activity, removing the power of governments
over national economies, and ushering in an era when states will cease to
matter in a borderless world. Some even say the time is approaching when
hundreds of millions of people in a global cyber-economy will interact
economically on the Internet, beyond the reach of government regula-
tions and taxes. Others say the world economy is no more integrated now
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than it was at the end of the nineteenth century, and that state power
remains largely unaffected.
The more convincing view lies between these extremes. Globalization
has shifted the balance of power between markets and states in markets’
favor and between capital and labor in capital’s favor. Globalization has
broadened the scope of market power while reducing that of government
power; since capital can move from one country to another more easily
than labor, capital exercises leverage over the terms on which labor is
offered, such as wages and working conditions. Globalization is chang-
ing the modern state in fundamental ways. Countries now compete more
aggressively for shares of the world market. Governments assess policies
by international standards. The highest efficiency in one location on the
globe becomes the “international best practice” that all other states seek
to emulate for the sake of their own export industries. If one country’s
corporate taxes are higher than another’s, then the higher taxes will be
reduced in order to discourage firms from moving offshore; wages in one
country adjust to competition from labor elsewhere; and governments are
transmitting international forces rather than sheltering people from them.
The real question is not whether globalization influences governments
but how much. Governments often claim that globalization leaves them
with no option but to sell off government-owned assets and reduce the
role of the state in the economy. Much as they might wish to retain assets
in government ownership, spend more on education, protect employment,
and so on, they cannot—they say—because otherwise their country would
lose international competitiveness and offend the financial markets whose
confidence is vital to national prosperity. While this claim is true, govern-
ments often want to privatize and deregulate anyway, and find it conve-
nient to claim that globalization forces their hand.
The fundamental reason behind the urge to privatize and deregulate—
indeed behind globalization itself—is the displacement since the 1970s of
one version of economic theory called Keynesianism, championed by
economists such as J K Galbraith, with another called economic rational-
ism or neoliberalism, which is now the set of economic ideas behind the
policymaking of most governments and of leading international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank. There exists an ideology of globaliza-
tion, an interpretation of how the world works and what should there-
fore be done. The ideology of globalization combines the notion of a lost
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golden age, said to exist before governments began regulating economies,
with the promise of a future utopia, still out of reach but attainable if the
right path is taken. Difficulties along the way—high unemployment, job
insecurity, financial crises, and so on—must be endured for the sake of
getting to the final goal. Ideologies do not come from nowhere; they coin-
cide with interests, in this case with those of the American and European
multinational banks, pension funds, and hedge funds that benefit from
global economic arrangements characterized by free movement of capi-
tal, small government, low taxes, constrained labor, low wages, and a
diminished welfare state. Conspiracy theories are not needed to explain
this coincidence of ideology and interest. It is to be expected.
Globalization and the Pacific Islands
I now return to the idea of two periods of globalization and examine the
first one, which lasted roughly from the 1850s to 1914. This first period
of globalization was when Pacific Island economies began to be integrated
into the global economy, as the buccaneers of global capitalism arrived
on their shores. The newcomers were sandalwood traders, copra traders,
planters, labor recruiters, guano miners, settlers, themselves driven by the
uprooting forces of the emerging global economic system to seek a living
beyond the legal systems of their own countries. As they collided with the
people who lived in the Pacific and had their own ways of doing things—
not always to the newcomers’ liking—they appealed to home govern-
ments for protection from the lawlessness of the frontier they themselves
had created. They wanted land claims approved, laborers controlled, debts
paid, and livelihoods secured. They wanted the law they knew, the one
that protected property, constrained labor, and made profits possible.
The home governments of these buccaneers did not rush to raise the flag
so they could rule on the settlers’ behalf and extend the domain of West-
ern-style capitalist development. The historical process was more compli-
cated. Some home governments, especially that of Great Britain, had to
be persuaded that establishing colonies was worth the trouble. In certain
cases—above all that of Britain in Fiji, but also Germany in Samoa—the
early colonial administrators were determined to discourage white set-
tlers, to disallow land claims, to preserve tradition, and to protect Pacific
peoples from rapid and uncontrolled modernization. Only in one case—
France in New Caledonia—did a European power succeed in creating a
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white settler colony in the tropical Pacific. A French company at one stage
claimed to have purchased half of Vanuatu, but did not attract enough
settlers to transform that claim into effective white settler occupation. 
The dark vision of many Europeans of the time was therefore unful-
filled. That vision was that the Pacific peoples were doomed to extinction
and the Europeans were destined to take their place. History, they thought,
would quietly and inevitably perform a kind of ethnic cleansing, leaving
the islands free for European occupation. Charles Woodford, the British
resident commissioner in the Solomons, wrote as much to the governor
of Fiji in 1909. Woodford was the man in charge, the equivalent of a
colonial governor, and in his words, “The whole population of the British
Solomons . . . will disappear. . . . My opinion is that nothing in the way of
the most paternal legislation or fostering care, carried out at any expense
whatever can prevent the eventual extinction of the Melanesian race in
the Pacific. This I look upon as a fundamental fact and as certain as the
rising and setting of the sun” (Bennett 1987, 146–147). As historian of
the Solomon Islands Judith Bennett commented, “the resident commis-
sioner reasoned that since all the islands would one day be totally depop-
ulated it would be in the best interests of the government and the future
of the Solomons to buy up the land” (1987, 147).
The overall effect of the coming of the colonial powers to the Pacific
was nevertheless to incorporate island territories into the global economy
on terms that suited the colonizing powers. In the age of the first global-
ization, no one for a moment thought that the imperial governments in
London or Paris or Berlin should pay the costs of governing tropical
dependencies. Colonial governments were expected to raise the money for
that, and the only way of doing it was to move colonies as fast as possi-
ble toward the cash economy, preferably by means of foreign investment
in the tropical resources valued by the Western world. The spur to rapid
Western-style economic development was, as much as anything, the burn-
ing need by colonial governments to have a modern tax base.
The First Globalization
Patterns of development differed from territory to territory, and colonial
powers protected native interests more in some places than in others, but
across the region the first globalization rapidly shaped colonial economies
into forms that were to last for much of the twentieth century. 
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Sugar transformed Hawai‘i. Sugar, sold at great profit to the United
States after 1875, made Hawai‘i so valuable to American planters that
they overthrew the independent Hawaiian government in 1893 and then
took Hawai‘i into the union as a territory five years later. Queen Lili-
‘uokalani, the deposed queen, wrote, “It had not entered our hearts to
believe that these friends and allies from the United States . . . would ever
. . . seize our nation by the throat, and pass it over to an alien power. . . .
An alien element composed of men of energy and determination control
all the resources of Honolulu and will employ them tirelessly to secure
their ends” (Dougherty 1996, 171). Not only that, the men of energy and
determination brought scores of thousands of people from other parts of
the world as indentured laborers for the sugar plantations—from Japan,
China, Portugal, Korea, and the Philippines especially—changing the face
of Hawai‘i forever and consigning the Hawaiians to minority status in
their own land.
Sugar transformed Fiji too, and in ways well known. Less well known,
however, is just how successful Fiji was as a sugar exporter, with the value
of exports per head of population not far behind that of countries such
as Australia and New Zealand by 1913, and with a favorable balance of
trade for 59 of the 65 years between 1875 and 1939. The trouble is that
Fiji’s sugar success was not translated into markedly higher standards of
living for its people. According to Bruce Knapman, the distribution of
proceeds from Fiji’s sugar exports in the early twentieth century was like
this: the Colonial Sugar Refining Company got 62 percent, the white
planters 36 percent, and the Indian laborers just 2 percent (1985, 66–83).
And most of the company’s 62 percent ended up in Australia and New
Zealand, not in Fiji. The copra trade worked in much the same way. Like
all tropical colonies during the first globalization, Fiji was a low-wage
colony. For a couple of decades between the world wars, sugar also trans-
formed the Northern Mariana Islands, which had a sugar industry almost
as big as Fiji’s by the end of the 1930s. But this was a temporary trans-
formation, reversed when the victorious Americans drove out the Japan-
ese in World War II.
In most other places copra was king. The early European colonists in
the Pacific tried to grow all sorts of things—tobacco, rubber, coffee,
vanilla, cacao—hoping they would become rich by selling to a global
market. But plant diseases and a shortage of labor defeated them, and in
the end, with a few exceptions such as rubber in Papua and coffee in New
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Caledonia, only one thing really worked—copra. Nowadays, coconut
plantations are not regarded as the leading edge of foreign investment,
but that is what they were in the 1880s and 1890s. If their coconut palms
were bearing by 1900, the planters were in luck. As the world price of
copra increased between 1900 and 1914, profits on copra plantations
skyrocketed. The big German plantation company in Samoa was paying
dividends worth 36 percent a year in the years before World War I. Copra
was not only king, it was money. Then there were the minerals that could
be dug up and taken away—phosphate, gold, and nickel. Phosphate pro-
duced the greatest profits of all for the shareholders of the companies that
mined it in Nauru, Banaba, Angaur in Palau, and Makatea in French
Polynesia.
What, then, did the Pacific Islands look like during this first globaliza-
tion? Like most of the rest of the tropical world, the easily accessible parts
of the islands underwent a modernizing revolution in the half century
before 1914. Globalization, when combined with colonial rule, meant
incorporation into the global economy on terms that suited the interests
of the colonial powers, whether the main export was Nauru phosphate,
Fiji sugar, Solomons copra, or Papua gold. The modernizing revolution
was not, however, one that propelled the Pacific Islands region to West-
ern standards of living, except possibly in a few places such as the Cook
Islands.
The place of the tropical world in the first globalization was subordi-
nate to the temperate and developed world. Wages were low, employers
used every conceivable device to keep them that way, and colonial gov-
ernments stood firmly behind employers. The Pacific village, and the labor
of the village women who remained behind while their men were away,
served as a hidden subsidy for a universal low-wage system. A great,
transforming upheaval took place in many parts of the Pacific Islands in
the half century before 1914. Young men in the coastal villages of Papua,
New Guinea, the Solomons, and Vanuatu left in their tens of thousands to
spend two, three, or five years under contract on plantations elsewhere in
the region or in Queensland. Some sixty thousand people came to Fiji
from the Indian subcontinent. A new kind of society arose everywhere in
the region—a colonial society—in which new political alliances replaced
old ones and a new caste system was superimposed on older, traditional
forms of government and means of status acquisition, sometimes through
alliances with existing chiefly classes as in Fiji, sometimes not.
07-CP 12-1 (fir pp.176-192)  9/22/04  10:25 AM  Page 184
dialogue • firth 185
The Second Globalization
In the Pacific, the current globalization dates from, say, the early 1970s
and is having a profound impact. The first question one might ask is where
the pressure is coming from to follow the globalization agenda. The
answer is that all the significant sources of advice for economic policy-
makers in the Pacific Islands now say the same thing. They are aid donors,
international financial institutions, banks, and investors, and they agree
that salvation for the economies of the region lies in opening themselves
up to international forces and becoming truly competitive.
Australia, for example, now prescribes the globalization agenda as a
cure for the ills of the Pacific Islands. A 1993 report by the National Cen-
tre for Development Studies in Canberra, Pacific 2010, summarized the
new orthodoxy in Australian thinking about the region. Its authors pre-
dicted that unless island governments changed course, their people would
face a nightmare of rising populations, falling living standards, decaying
schools, urban squalor, and unemployment. According to Australia, Pacific
Island countries should reduce their public sectors, cut tariffs, encourage
private enterprise, and allow maximum freedom to foreign investors in
order to become more competitive in a globalizing economy. Australia
embraced this new hard-headed approach to its Pacific aid policy in 1994,
when Minister for Pacific Island Affairs Gordon Bilney broadcast a speech
to island capitals, declaring that he could see “no realistic alternative to
competition and the pursuit of comparative advantage, no matter how
daunting these concepts may appear.” There is a new conditionality in
Australian aid, which means using aid as a carrot and stick to ensure
Pacific Island governments reduce the size of their civil services, privatize,
encourage foreign investment, and so on.
The European Union makes the same point. In its 1996 Green Paper on
relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific nations, the European
Union called for “structural adjustment,” “integration into the global
trading system,” and “good governance.”
The region is listening. As the Cook Islands Prime Minister Sir Geoffrey
Henry told the Pohnpei meeting of the South Pacific Forum in 1998, eco-
nomic reform issues had risen to the top of the international agenda,
“stimulated by fundamental changes in the international economic envi-
ronment.” The 1998 Forum Economic Ministers Meeting (femm) mea-
sured their success against the key criteria enunciated by the three inter-
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national economic institutions that now have the greatest influence on
economies in the Asia-Pacific—the World Trade Organization (wto), the
International Monetary Fund (imf), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration group (apec). The issues addressed by femm2 were “open, liberal
and transparent investment policies,” “strategies for enhancing competi-
tiveness,” “rationalising and progressively reducing tariffs,” multilateral
trade liberalization, and almost as an afterthought, the “reform impact,”
that is, the effect of policy changes on the people of Pacific Island coun-
tries. The theme of the 1998 South Pacific Forum meeting in Pohnpei—
“From Reform to Growth: The Private Sector and Investment as the Keys
to Prosperity”—captured the spirit of the times. The Forum “noted the
importance of the private sector and investment as the keys to economic
growth and agreed that efforts should be made to ensure macro economic
stability by improving fiscal discipline, further progressing public sector
reforms and broadening the tax base” (Forum Secretariat 1998, 56). Trans-
lated, this means that Forum island governments will give business open
slather, spend less, cut the numbers of civil servants, and move more of the
tax burden from companies to individuals.
The Pacific Islands had no choice whether or not to accept the first
globalization, and they have no choice this time either. Pacific Island gov-
ernments in the late 1990s have no alternative but to embrace policies of
economic liberalization. The international pressures are too great to do
otherwise, and the capacity of international financial institutions to com-
pel obedience too large. Yet at the same time they should fear the full
effects of open global competition and understand the implications for
the people of the region of what is happening.
Characteristics of Globalization
The three major characteristics of globalization that might affect the
Pacific Islands are the move toward free trade, the technological revolu-
tion in communication, and the freedom of capital movement around the
world. I discuss each of these in turn.
Free Trade
The world is moving toward free trade in goods and services. Countries
are liberalizing trade by lowering and removing tariffs, quotas, and sub-
sidies. Special trading arrangements are now regarded as antiquated. One
example is the Lomé Convention between the European Union and
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African, Caribbean, and Pacific states (acp), which include Fiji, Kiribati,
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanu-
atu. These Pacific states have for years benefited from trade preferences
under the Lomé Convention that give their agricultural exports preferen-
tial access to the European market. Fiji in particular has depended heav-
ily on the high price for its sugar paid under the Lomé arrangements, a
price that has sustained an entire social system of small-farm sugar pro-
duction by mostly Indo-Fijian tenant farmers. Both Fiji and the Solomons
have benefited from Lomé arrangements that permit canned tuna to enter
the European Union duty free,while canned tuna from elsewhere pays a
tariff.
The Fourth Lomé Convention, covering aid and trade to former Euro-
pean colonial dependencies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific,
expires in 2000, to be replaced by arrangements that are yet to be nego-
tiated but will not offer trade protection of the old kind. Lomé IV could
not be succeeded by something similar, because its protective provisions
run counter to wto rules about international trade. In any case, the global
movement toward free trade renders special trade concessions less special.
Much is at stake in this transition from Lomé IV to what is called the
Successor Agreement. The Pacific acp states met in Suva last year and
fashioned a joint negotiating position, which acp ministers then took to
the acp-eu talks in Brussels in September and October, the start of a
diplomatic process that, as Sir Geoffrey Henry said, would “no doubt
prove long and arduous.” Ministers emphasized the region’s economic
reform credentials and hoped that, post-Lomé, their small and isolated
countries would not be left to survive entirely without protection in an
increasingly free-trade world. The negotiations are continuing.
No one imagines that Lomé will simply be restored in its present form.
The special protection of Fiji’s sugar exports is coming to an end, and
with it perhaps the way in which sugar has traditionally been grown in
Fiji. Once that protection is gone, the marginal farms will be gone, more
and more people from the sugar belt will move to the towns, and Fiji will
be more urbanized than ever. By one estimate, the removal of Lomé pref-
erences would reduce the average cane farmer’s net income from f$4,300
to f$165. It is even conceivable that the whole concept of small-farm
sugar production might become so uneconomic in the long run that it has
to be abandoned, with a return to the original system of producing sugar
on large mechanized estates. That now happens, I understand, in Mauri-
tius, which is sometimes held up as a model for Fiji to follow. The social
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and even political consequences for Fiji might well be profound, just as
they might be if the losses of the tuna cannery in Ovalau grow and the
Pacific Fishing Company’s whole operation has to be closed down, throw-
ing hundreds of mainly women workers out of a job. I give these as exam-
ples of my general proposition, which is that the second globalization
could well prove to be as transformative for the Pacific Islands as the first. 
The Technological Revolution and Electronic Commerce
The flow of electronic information across national borders is growing
exponentially year by year. On the face of things, the growth of electronic
commerce and the Internet might appear to offer countries like Fiji an
opportunity, because they finally abolish the constraint that experts have
always complained about in this part of the world. They abolish distance
and render it irrelevant. If Fiji had a highly educated workforce in the
area of computer software, it is possible that Fiji—and other Pacific coun-
tries for that matter—could develop export industries in computer exper-
tise, with the exports going silently into space to satellites and then down
to computer companies in Silicon Valley in California. The trouble is that
the pace of sophistication in the computer industry is so fast that special-
ization in computer skills would be difficult for island countries to
develop—not impossible, but difficult.
The Mobility of Capital
A third characteristic of the modern global economy is the freedom of cap-
ital movement. Massive amounts of money are being invested and with-
drawn from investment across national borders as global financial mar-
kets decide where capital should and should not go. The essence of the
Bretton Woods system of rules for the operation of the global economy
after World War II, conceived in the wake of the Great Depression, was to
liberalize international trade while regulating international capital move-
ments. The essence of the global economic order since the 1970s has been
to liberalize trade further and to deregulate capital movements altogether.
The result is a dynamic, yet inherently unstable and volatile global econ-
omy, in which countries that fall out of favor with the international
financial markets can be plunged into sudden currency devaluations,
widespread bankruptcy, unemployment, and—as is happening in Indo-
nesia—social unrest, religious hatred, and violence.
Freedom of capital movement allows for speculative capital flows that
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follow a logic with little relevance to a country’s real economic prospects.
The cost is borne by bankrupt businesses, unemployed workers, drasti-
cally restructured economies, and destabilized governments. Things were
no different in the first era of globalization. Speculative flows of capital
into Argentina in the late 1880s, for example, fueled a real estate boom
that ended in a crash, recession, widespread unemployment, and the sale
of many Argentine businesses cheaply to foreign investors. Then, as now,
financial collapses transmitted themselves rapidly from one country in a
region to other parts of that region, and eventually to the entire global
economy. There are striking parallels with the 1997 Thailand crash, which
spread quickly to other East Asian economies and beyond.
Almost us$100 billion flowed into Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines and South Korea in 1996, up from us$41 billion in 1994.
Having fueled a boom in these countries, the banks and other capital
holders turned a massive inflow of private capital into an outflow of
us$12 billion in 1997, as investors stumbled over each other in the rush
to get their money out. Banks competed with each other to lend money,
and investment funds competed to buy shares for as long as the market
mood dictated that East Asia was in favor. Competition among the lenders
made borrowing cheap. Money was easy to get, and East Asian businesses
made unwise decisions, fueling a boom in asset prices that could not be
sustained.
The psychology of capital markets is different from that of markets in
goods and services. Players in capital markets are given to panics and
manias. Investors praise national economic performance one day and
denounce it the next. The abrupt reversal in the way the international
financial markets interpreted prospects for East Asian economies—mov-
ing from excessive optimism at the beginning of 1997 to extreme pessi-
mism by 1998—owed more to the irrational psychology of the capital mar-
ket than to economic reality. Just as a herd mentality distorts investors’
judgments as a boom builds, so it fosters panic during a crash. What
some investors do, irrespective of the merits of the case, becomes the deci-
sive consideration for other investors on the way up and on the way down.
While the behavior of individual market players is rational from their
point of view, the behavior of all players acting together is not. As the
contagion spreads, the market’s loss of confidence in a national economy
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as the currency is devalued, interest
rates rise, and businesses lose the capacity to repay foreign debt. 
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Classical economics of the kind that has inspired economic rationalism
makes little allowance for this irrational, psychological side of market
behavior.
In the East Asian case, almost all the effects of the sudden withdrawal
of capital were negative from the point of view of governments and peo-
ple in the region. As the demand for national currencies disappeared, gov-
ernments were forced to push up interest rates, mostly to levels that
caused widespread bankruptcies. Then came the fire sale of East Asian
companies, now desperate for cash and willing to sell to foreign multina-
tionals. The American firms DuPont, Coca-Cola, Eastman Kodak, Gen-
eral Motors, and Procter & Gamble were among the multinationals that
bought cheaply into the region in 1998. The immediate effect of the cri-
sis, then, was to compel a number of East Asian governments to surren-
der policymaking autonomy, accept the rules of the globalized economy,
loosen controls on foreign ownership, permit an Americanization of parts
of their economies, and submit to the conditions demanded by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund in return for loans.
The small currencies of the Pacific Islands are not threatened by mas-
sive international financial speculation, but they are subjected to the dis-
cipline such speculation creates, and they are susceptible to devaluation,
and even repeated devaluations, as countries seek to protect the value of
exports in an increasingly competitive world. The end of the Lomé Agree-
ment, for example—unless it is replaced by something much the same—
could well bring another devaluation of the Fiji dollar simply because of
its negative impact on Fiji’s export earnings. As is known from Fiji’s expe-
rience in the last year, the pain of devaluation is felt most by those at the
bottom of the pile, because the price of imports increases. Devaluation in
Fiji assisted the tourist industry at the expense of many ordinary Fiji cit-
izens, whose dollars no longer bought as much as they had before. In the
longer term, South Pacific governments may have to abandon their
national currencies altogether in favor of a regional currency or even the
use of the Australian dollar (in the same way as northern Pacific govern-
ments use the American dollar). If that were to happen, governments of
the region would lose much of the control they now have over national
economic life, and would become branch offices of the Australian Reserve
Bank. Currency unions of the European kind are now on the globalization
agenda.
07-CP 12-1 (fir pp.176-192)  9/22/04  10:25 AM  Page 190
dialogue • firth 191
Counterbalancing Globalization
In a world rapidly headed for the so-called level playing field, the Pacific
Islands will continue to argue that they are special and should be treated
specially. Development classification, for example, has long been impor-
tant for Pacific Island countries, because to be classified by international
organizations as a Least Developed Country brings benefits and conces-
sions even in a rapidly globalizing world. For this reason the South Pacific
Forum pushed again for the completion of a comprehensive vulnerability
index—a measure of the exposure of economies to forces beyond govern-
ment control, such as natural disasters, smallness, and isolation—which
could then be included among the criteria for determining Least Devel-
oped Country status. Vulnerability is an issue raised by Pacific acp min-
isters in their talks over Lomé with the European Union, and it will be
raised again at the United Nations special session on small island devel-
oping states in 1999. 
The trouble is that the new rules of a globalizing world are being set
by people who have little interest in small places or special cases. On the
contrary, the whole logic of globalization is to standardize rules so that
there are no special breaks for any country, whatever its circumstances.
Comparative advantage is everything, and if a country doesn’t have many
comparative advantages, that’s bad luck. 
To be fair, all is not gloom. Most Pacific Island societies have charac-
teristics that will counterbalance globalization. 
The first is communal land tenure, much derided by aid donors as a
barrier to development. For all its faults, communal land tenure continues
to act in many countries as an informal system of social security, which is
needed now and might be needed more if the Pacific becomes more mar-
ginalized in a globalized economy. The second is out-migration to New
Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United States and the return flow of
remittances to families in the Pacific. Migration gives the Pacific a direct
economic connection to those economies—the advanced ones—that most
benefit from globalization and creates a flow of resources in the opposite
direction from the normal one. The third is smallness itself, which seems
to encourage compromise in politics and, for the most part, stable polit-
ical systems. 
Nevertheless, just as the place of the Pacific Islands in the first global-
ization was to be subordinate to the temperate, developed world, so their
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place in the second globalization is also to be subordinate, this time to a
set of international institutions that have set the rules of the global econ-
omy. The new globalization, now combined with independent, sovereign
rule, means incorporation into the global economy on terms that suit the
interests of the financial markets, the aid donors, and those relatively few
Pacific Islanders who are in a position to benefit from the new situation. 
*  *  *
This essay was originally delivered on 28 April 1999 at the Oceania Centre for
Arts and Culture, University of the South Pacific, as part of a lecture series orga-
nized by Epeli Hau‘ofa. The essay draws on material previously published in
Australia in International Politics: An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy
(Firth 1999).
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